



Chapter 5
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India's relation with China has followed a Zigzag course in the last sixty four years. The relation had some times been warmer, sometimes more troubled occasionally abrasive, frequently soured by divergent perceptions interests and foreign policy courses; the relationship is marked, if not marred by instability and fluctuations. The relation has rarely been on an even keel. The Chinese have been more offensive all through. They would say something and do other way which is marked by two attacks in the western and eastern borders in Oct 1962 though they were repeatedly proclaiming on border and through media – “HINDI CHINI BHAIBHAI”? The Chinese People's Liberation Army attacked on 1000 apart and expelled Indian Forces. The Bilateral ties have been subject to misperception and complicated by U.S. – Soviet completions and rivalry between India and Pakistan the end of cold war and the policy of economic liberalization initiated by Prime Minister P.V.Narshima Rao when he came to the power in 1991 presented a historic opportunity to improve ties.

The cold war was characterized by East and West ideological and military rivalry, epitomized by United States on one side and a Russian Dominated soviet union on the other. The U.S.A. spoke of liberty and democracy the Soviet Union proclaimed peace one freedom, both built up vast quantities of weapons, conventional and nuclear in an extended arms race that caused economic hardship and environmental harm to sections of their own citizen and allies, U.S.A had its close ally, Britain, France. The Soviet Union and China had complicated relations, at time communist allies against west, but also with their own territorial political and ideological rivalries. Each of the superpowers had its own sphere of influence, which tended to distort political relation though out the world.

The end of the cold war has brought India and China in the phase of talking terms. The former Eastern block states wanted acceptance into Europe and identification with west primarily for the economic benefits to help stabilize their fledgling democracies and to distance themselves from Russia. For many, joining the European Union was more attractive than NATO, which they hoped would be replace by a new PAN

European Security Architecture, the period of 1987 to 1995 was immensely important for arms control. China was a little off to one side. Having joined the non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons convention (NPT) in 1992 and after participating in P-5 talks the margins of the CTBT China was more integrated into discussions than ever before, but still with important difference on issues such as no first use, unconditional security assurance and peaceful nuclear explosions. The U.S.A. appeared to be looking more towards china perceiving it both as a principal player and (at least in some Quarters) as a growing potential threat.

Despite the lifting of cold war constraints in many policy spheres both the countries remain shackled to the past in political terms. India is determined to continue its economic liberalization policies and is quite resolute in implementing further reforms without slackening the peace. And at the same time it had been remained hopeful of consolidation of the efforts taken so far to bring the china official, on talking table six rounds of talks of the Indian Chinese joint working group on the Border issue were held between December 1988 and June 1993 and also the visit of PRC Premier Li Pang to India in Dec.

1991 and in May 1992 visit of Indian President R. Venkataraman to China. This helped visit of Mr. Sharad Pawar the Defense Minister in July 1992 could being development of academic, Military, Scientific and technological exchange the efforts were aimed to “Fostering confidence building measure between the defense forces of the two countries”, confidence building measures, clarification of the “line of actual control” mutual understanding and concessions.

Sino Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following nuclear tests in may, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez declared that “China is India’s number one threat” hitting that India developed nuclear weapons in defense against china’s nuclear arsenal thus, China become one of the strongest international critics of India’s nuclear club . Relations between India and China stayed strained until the end of the decade. With Indian President K.R.Narayanana’s visit to china 2000 marked gradual engagement of India and Chinese diplomacy 2004 also witnessed a gradual improvement in the international are when the two countries proposed opening of Nathual and Jelega passes in Sikkim which mutually benefited both the countries in their bilateral

trade. Remark of the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at Bangalore in April 2005, “cooperation is just like two pagodas (temples), one hardware and one software. Combined we can take the leadership position in the world” Ween stated that 21st century will be Asian Century of the I.T. industry. Further China reopened an ancient trade route which was part of the Silk Road. Which was closed in 2006? It further improved with the visit of Mr.Wen Jiabao chinese premier with 400 Chinese business leaders who wished to sign business deals with Indian companies.

In April 2011 the two countries agreed to restore defense cooperation and china had hinted that it may reverse its policy of administering stapled visas to residents of Jammu & Kashmir.

The transformation of Indo-China relations on economic side is occurring dramatically, with India’s economic reforms and deregulation of economy the Chinese are looking to India with renewed interest. Now China is becoming a very good business partner of India and has started investing in India. Seeing the whooping growth in Sino-Indian trade, China outlined five point

agenda, including reducing trade barriers and enhancing multilateral cooperation to boost bilateral trade. Indian commerce minister Mr. Kamal Nath said China was poised to become India's largest trade partner in the next two three years next only to U.S. and Singapore. The greatest draw back in the trade for India is that it has been supplying mostly primary goods to china and value added items especially and electrical machinery items were traded in while burg coming trade holds good for both countries there is plenty of scope for further enlargement of trade basket. The identified trade areas are biotechnology, information technology, health, education tourism and financial sector.

It is quite clear that economic relations should be the focal point of China engagement with the region. The economic agenda is the most positive change in our own bilateral relations and it on this basis of broadening this agenda that the relationship between the two countries can be consolidated.

The relationship between Asian countries has often found each other frustrating and irritating. The obstacles to regional cooperation must not be underestimated it is

also true that majority are not of India's making. India occupies a central location and its size and economy are overwhelming there suffer from an acute small state syndromes even though in terms of population and size each is large by global standards. Regrettably the Indian state has also not done enough to provide the necessary confidence to these countries through sustained engagement, New Delhi has rightly maintained a high record of accommodation but our neighbor has not demonstrated reasonable concern and sensitivity to India's security the current Pakistani policies, which do not allow even minimal trade relationship with India, offer little hope of significant regional arrangement for economic cooperation. Indian strategic analysis, not to make a mistake of the past by downplaying Chinese border aggression. Chinese will interpret the silence as a sign of weakness and exploit it.

China is strengthening its ties to India's historical rival Pakistan and slowly gaining influence with other south Asian states that border India, the south Asian nations view good ties with china as a useful counterweight to Indian dominance in the region. China provided military supplies to Nepalese King Gyanendra

before he stepped down in 2005 while India and U.S. were restricting their military assistance in an effort to promote political reconciliation within the country. Chinese assistance to Sri Lanka has increased substantially over the past year and constructing a new port facility at Hambantota harbor. Indian analysts warn it could be used as a Chinese naval base to control the area; Bangladesh has turned down India's proposal for a tri-nation gas pipeline with Burma that makes clear the relationship.

The transformation of India-U.S. relation on economic side is occurring dramatically. With India's economic reforms and deregulation of the economy U.S. business has started looking to India with renewed intent the United States is now the biggest trading partner should be the focal point of U.S. engagement with the region. The economic agenda is the most positive change in our bilateral relations with U.S. and it is on the basis of broadening this agenda that the relationship between the two countries can be consolidated. U.S. at this juncture has become bogged down in the controversy relating to the Nuclear Non Proliferation threat no one but

Washington is to blame rather than keep the focus of the Indo-U.S. relationship on economic issues.

Indeed, the fact is that while the Indian and U.S. policy making elites have been found each other frustrating and irritating the bond between the intellectual-business-social-political elites of the two countries is today stronger than at any other time in the past. More important India's establishment elites are more closely linked to the U.S. than any other countries. The professional Indian middle class the new entrepreneurial group in subcontinent's more developed regions of western and southern India as well as the big business class in India have a closer rapport with the U.S. than any other country. We recognize that the U.S. is the "Mecca" of India's new business and professional classes.

It is observed that Indian influence over Chinese culture has been great but Chinese effect upon Indian culture has been very little. If we consider the merits of these two cultures the religions and philosophy of India are of course, supreme and unparalleled in human history, but the ethics and art of china are also superior

and matchless. Many Indian classical books were translated into Chinese and yet none of Chinese great works rendered into Sanskrit the reason may be Chinese mentality might be receptive and sensitive to absorb and assimilate any other good civilization but shy and reluctant to propagandize. Something however, has china great fully done for Indian culture though not directly but indirectly. It is that she has taken great care and much effort to preserve, to cherish, to cultivate and magnify what she had got from India at different ages. Though the Chinese University provided scholarship facilities and many opportunities to the student fraternity only 800 students joined the Chinese university against their total strength of 1.1 million foreign students.

Growth projections for china and India underline many challenges both have to overcome in sustaining high growth rates and accelerating the reform prices without social disruptions. Unlike china's authoritarian regime, India's democratic machinery moves slowly and broad political converser is not easily achievable for essential reforms. The prospect of India and China forging closer links for common causes will depend on china's willingness to settle the border dispute speedily

and become even handed in relation with its south Asian neighbors. As long as the border dispute persists, normalization of relation becomes difficult and India cannot give up its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent in the face of proliferation of destructive weapons in the neighborhood.

The demise of the cold war has ushered in a new phase in international relations that is characterized by new forms of conflict. Whereas the cold war conflict was mainly between the West and the East, with devastating effects on the Third World, the new era has seen the emergence of new and in some countries the intensification of intra- state conflicts which always have a potential to assume an international character. The world is also experiencing higher levels of terrorism than have been seen before. The United States, Britain and other European countries have become targets of ferocious attacks where the enemy uses lethal strategies to destabilize them and the world at large.

The consequence of the change from the Cold War era to the post Cold War era is that diplomacy, defined by Sir Harold Nicolson as “*the management of international*

relation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys.....”, also has to change in approach in order to cope with the new developments.

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated security considerations from the end of the Second World War in 1945 until 1989. As countries of the Eastern Bloc emerged to claim independence and democracy, a new post-cold war era was heralded. It was a heady time, full of optimism and possibility. George Bush spoke of the “*new world order*”. Some analysts wrote of the “*end of history*”; others claimed the triumph of democracy over totalitarianism. It was hoped that with removal of the paranoia and waste of the bipolar stand-off, it might be possible to implement collective security initiatives, such as those identified in the Brandt and Brundtland commissions of the 1980s. Although the Soviet Union and Warsaw treaty organization (or Warsaw pact) dissolved, the feared division into several new nuclear-weapon states was averted¹. Whole classes of nuclear weapons were removed and others taken off alert. The decades of East-West nuclear confrontation appeared to give way to East-West cooperation, exemplified by arms control treaties and the Russian

Federation's participation in new security arrangements such as the organization for Security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the economic consultations exemplified by the G-8.

In less than a decade, however, much of the optimism has been lost. The Russian Federation and some of its former soviet neighbors' are in economic and political turmoil. Asian tiger economies are collapsing, causing political upheavals across the region and threatening the assumption and even stability of western financial institutions. The '*grand coalition*' of forces against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, of which George Bush was so proud, has given way to the long, drawn out war of nerves and attrition between UNSCOM and Saddam Hussein, fragmenting the early post-cold war security council partnership and casting a long shadow over western security thinking throughout the 1990s. The implementation of some arms control agreements has been parlayed by ratification delays and disputes over resources, while further opportunities to reduce and control arms have been squandered. The achievement after so many years of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was widely viewed as a success

thereby strengthening the international norm against nuclear proliferation; but barely eighteen months after it was signed, had India and then Pakistan conducted several nuclear explosions, giving rise to serious concerns about the overall health and credibility of the non-proliferation regime

The Cold War

The cold war was characterized by East-West ideological and military rivalry, epitomized by the United States on one side and a Russian-dominated Soviet union on the other. The United States spoke of liberty and democracy, the Soviet Union proclaimed peace and freedom. Both built up vast quantities of weapons, conventional and nuclear, in an extended arms race that caused economic hardship and environmental harm to sections of their own citizenry and allies. Though arms “*aid*” covert intelligence activities and the bolstering of local (and often corrupt) elites, they fostered proxy wars in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Between them they sought to divide the world and portion out influence in international institutions, including the United Nations and the Conference on disarmament. They invariably

behaved as suspicious almost paranoid opponents; what one supported the other would reject with positions sometimes reversed at the next encounter. If the United States was prepared to offer a test ban or fissile material cut-off, the Soviet Union was suspicious that it would freeze a situation of Soviet inferiority; if the Soviets were ready to offer such measures, the United States was convinced that they had clandestine plans up their sleeves. Whenever the United States talked about verification, the Soviets feared that detailed and intrusive American proposals were a cover for spying; Soviet resistance to such intrusion was inevitably interpreted as protecting an intention to cheat. Within the United Nations Security Council, the United States had its close ally, Britain, France also was a member of NATO, although not militarily integrated and with its own strategic interests in Africa and Asia, which sometimes ran counter to Anglo-American positions. The Soviet Union and China had a complicated relationship, at times communist allies against the capitalist west, but also with their own territorial, political and ideological rivalries. The bipolar rivalry rendered the Security Council impotent and made arms control extremely difficult.

Each of the superpowers had its own sphere of influence, which tended to distort political relations throughout the world.

Squandering the post-cold war opportunities

At first, the post-cold war era was perceived by many as a chance to dissolve or transform the military alliances representing the East-west Blocs, namely the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Certainly the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. But instead of NATO also giving way to an alternative structure for European or North Atlantic security, the Alliance was not inevitable and may prove to be a costly mistake. The former Eastern Bloc states wanted acceptance into Europe and identification with the West primarily for the economic benefits, to help stabilize their fledgling democracies and to distance themselves from Russia. For many, joining the European Union was more attractive than NATO, which they hoped would be replaced by a new pan-European security Architecture. Poland and the Czech Republic led the push to expand NATO only after the dithering of the European Union and the under-resourcing and marginalization of the OSCE's forerunner, the conference

on security and co-operation in Europe, made clear that alternatives were not on offer.

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operation in Europe, made clear that alternatives were not on offer.

The drive to tie NATO expansion to building up its military capabilities was spearheaded by a consortium of American arms manufacturers.² with its declared operational shift towards fulfilling the Petersburg humanitarian, conflict management and peace-making tasks identified by the Western European Union Council in 1992, NATO is increasingly presented in the grab of a humanitarian service. This helps with public relations and the maintenance of larger budgets than would otherwise be considered acceptable. The continued peacetime sitting of nuclear weapons in seven European countries as part of nuclear sharing arrangements, as well as the reliance on potential first use(albeit as a last resort), may be coming under pressure. Nevertheless, despite having no comparable adversary, NATO is still being built up and modernized as a pre-eminently military and nuclear alliance. With its nose rubbed daily in the inadequacies of its own conventional forces, Moscow's response to NATO expansion and its perception of increased instability and threat on its southern flank has been to reassert the importance of its

nuclear forces (as a force equalizer rather than power projection) and drag its feet on arms control.

The period from 1987 to 1995 was immensely important for arms control. China was a little off to one side. Having joined the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Convention (NPT) in 1992, and after participating in P-5 talks in the margins of the CTBT, China was more integrated into the discussions than ever before, but still with important differences on issues such as no first use, unconditional security assurances and “*peaceful*” nuclear explosions. The Russians were very sensitive about losing their declining economic and military clout. At the same time, the United States appeared to be looking more towards china, perceiving it both as a principal player and (at least in some quarters) as a growing potential threat.

Old Answers to New Security challenges

The commonly identified “*new security challenges*” include the “*proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growth of ethnic nationalism and extremism, international terrorism, and crime and drug trafficking*”. On the one hand, such reassessments provided arguments for a more

flexible force structure, as expressed in the 1997 United States Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and in the United Kingdom Strategic Defense Review, Chinese Defense White Paper and French restructuring decisions, all of which were issued in mid-1998. Under the rubric of “*uncertainty*” calculations, however, Pentagon planners seem to have elevated worst-case scenarios and hypothetical risk assessments to the basis for planning without adequately distinguishing between assumption of technical access or feasibility and any actual likelihood of operational acquisition, including motivation, intention, funding, infrastructure and so on. Having emerged pre-eminent from the long Cold war, American planners seem fixated by their military vulnerability against much weaker foes. The QDR requires that American forces should alone be able to fight and win two major theatre wars “*nearly simultaneously*”, never mind the implausibility of such a scenario in the post-cold war geo-strategic context. As a result, military expenditure and force structures are to be maintained at levels equivalent to 77% of the average at the height of the cold war (1976-1990). The resulting dynamic is a “*continuous, solitary*

arms race in which the United States labors to outdistance its own shadow”

From dealing with the weapon-rich environment of cold war threats, American nuclear forces are apparently being reconfigured to respond to the multi polar, post-cold war's target-rich environment. The Russian Federation now faced with demoralization and ill-equipped military forces and inadequate conventional weapons, has turned completely away from Gorbachev's vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world by the year 2000, to assert the necessity of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, while calling for negotiation on a nuclear weapon convention and promoting unconditional prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons. As the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 showed, nuclear weapons are still perceived as the pre-eminent currency of power and prestige. Where the cold war rested on East-West military and ideological rivalry, the initial post-cold war optimism posited more collective and cooperative security arrangements and an opportunity for new security thinking. This positive concept turned out to be very short lived and by 1995 the dominant policy imperative had already shifted towards

new threat assessments, targeting strategies and justification for high levels of military readiness. The multi polar world is now portrayed not as an opportunity for collective security, but as a dangerously unstable mix of disintegrating economies and over-armed ethnic and regional warlords with ambitions, grudges or religious delusions of divine dominance. Neither hot nor cold, the Post-Cold War era seems to have left the pre-eminent military power, the United States, hedging its bets against any and all wild card and worst-case scenarios involving sub-national or state actors.

Pentagon planners have maneuvered the United State Into “*tepid war*” readiness for a resurgent Russian threat if the Russian federation disintegrates into anarchy or lurches into Zyuganov-type communist reversion or Zhirinovskiy-type nationalism. At the same time, china’s growing confidence and Islamic fundamentalism are being assessed as future military threats. The experience with Saddam Hussein has fuelled a security approach in which rogue states are very high on the agenda, with North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya all viewed as potential proliferators or supporters of terrorism. It is, of course, important to be prepared for

the worst, but the proposed defenses and responses should be appropriate in approach and magnitude to the risks and threats. Instead, domestic, partisan and financial interests have abetted the modernization of nuclear and military forces and missile defenses demanded by a faction within the pentagon and the Republican Party, allied to the powerful arms lobby.

Nuclear and conventional doctrines and forces in the west (with the inclusion of a first wave of former Eastern Bloc states) are being reconfigured, ostensibly to meet threat assessments that prioritize terrorism and fundamentalism or respond to humanitarian crises, but still with heavy emphasis on throwing resources into traditional attempts to achieve military supremacy. Over-reliance on military perceptions has already resulted in the triumph of short-term interests over long-term understandings. Military expenditure has been reduced, but not by very much. As the end of the cold war resulted in pressure to cut domestic defense requirements, the requirements for applicant states to NATO to build compatible military forces has been one area for expansion by western (especially American) defense industries. Even as key Islamic states are demonized in

defense analyses, western arms manufactures have continued to target countries in the Middle East for lucrative arms sales, often using taxpayers' money as sweeteners for further deals. Concerns about the destabilizing effects of military sales, especially in vulnerable regions, have yet to be translated into effective policies to curb the powerful arms manufacturers in the dominant countries

Location

India and China share a long border, sectioned into three stretches by Nepal and Bhutan, which follows the Himalayan mountains between Burma and what then West Pakistan. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai China region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang and Tibet (which China declared as an autonomous region in 1965). The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North East Frontier Agency). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict.

Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai chin region is a vast desert of salt flats around 5,000 meters above sea level, and Arunachal Pradesh is extremely numerical superiority over the defender; in mountain warfare this ratio should be considerably higher as the terrain favors' defense. China was able to take advantage of this: the Chinese Army had possession of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the Italian Campaign of World War I) more casualties have been many troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold.

BACKGROUND

The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang. China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict. Arunachal Pradesh (called south Tibet by China) is also claimed by both nations – although it is roughly the size of Austria, it was sparsely inhabited in the days of the war (by numerous local tribes) due to its

mountainous terrain. However it has a population of over one million today.

THE JOHNSON LINE

The Western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originated in 1834, with the Sikh Confederation's conquest of Ladakh. In 1842, the Sikh Confederacy which at the time ruled over much of Northern India (including the frontier regions of Jammu and Kashmir) signed a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of its existing borders with its neighbors. The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh, part of the Jammu and Kashmir region, to the British, and British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border. The boundaries at its two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram pass, were well defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined. In 1865, British surveyor W.H. Johnson came to an agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir, in whose service he was employed on a proposed "*Johnson Line*" which placed Aksai Chin in Kashmir. China rejected the doubts, so it decided to take up the issue in an attempt to reach a settlement. However in 1892, before the issue had

been resolved china erected boundary markers at Karakoram pass on the ancient caravan route between Xinjiang and Ladakh (which were disputed by the British Indian government). Throughout most of the 19th century Great Britain and the expanding Russian Empire were jockeying for influence in Central Asia, and Britain decided to hand over Aksai Chin to Chinese administration as a buffer against Russian invasion. The newly created border was known as the McCartney – MacDonald Line, and both British-controlled India and China now began to show Aksai Chin as Chinese. In 1911 the Xinhai Revolution resulted in power shifted in China, and by 1918 (in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution) the British no longer saw merit in China's continuing possession of the region. On British maps, the border was redrawn as the original Johnson Line in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situation. By the time of Indian independence in 1947, the Johnson Line had become India's official Western boundary

On 1 July 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru definitively stated the Indian position .He claimed that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for

centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was non-negotiable. According to George N. Patterson; when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India's claims to the disputed area, *"the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed"*.

During the 1950s, China constructed a road through AksainChin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places

India china economy Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the Karakoran Mountains, was more problematic. Consequently India did not even learn of the existence of the road until 1957 finally confirmed when the road was shown in Chinese maps published the following years.

THE McMAHON LINE

McMahon Line and Simla Accord (1913)

In 1826, British India and China gained a common border after the British wrested control of Manipur and Assam from the Burmese, following the First Anglo-Burmese War of 1824-1826. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins,

agent for the North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R. Graham, NEFA official, which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. Thus, in the last half of the 19th century, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a 1 June 1912 note from the British General Staff in India, stating that the *“present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border.”* A 1908 map of the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam prepared for the Foreign Department of the Government of India, showed the international boundary from Bhutan continuing to the Barrio River, following the Himalayas foothills alignment. In 1913, representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet attended a conference in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet, China and India. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, Beijing later objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and inner Tibet, and did not ratify it. The details of the Indo-Tibetan boundary were

not revealed to China at the time. The foreign secretary of the British Indian government, Henry McMahon, who had drawn up the proposal decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian. However, the McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims. India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India, While it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient timesThe British-run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "*except through the intermediary of the Chinese government*". The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921. It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region.

China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make and a treaty, rejected Tibet's claims of independence rule. For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of Tawang which the line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction.

In 1950s, India began actively patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line. Given India's historic position that the original intent of the line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention.

CHINESE OFFENSIVE

On 20 October 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1,000 km. apart. In the western theatre, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture both banks of

the Namka Chu River. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in the Indian state of Sikkim. Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.

Eastern Theatre

On the eastern theatre, the PLA attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on 17 Nov. Their positions were defended by the Indian 4th Infantry Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops. Se La occupied high ground and rather than assault this commanding position, the Chinese captured Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La.

Western Theatre

On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. Chinese forces quickly swept the region of any remaining Indian troops. Late on 19 October, Chinese troops launched a number of attacks

throughout the western theatre. By 22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been cleared.

On 20 October, the Chinese easily took the Chip Chap valley, and Pangong Lake. Many outposts and garrisons along the Western front were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts offered resistance but were either killed or taken prisoner. Indian support for these outposts was not forthcoming as evidenced by the Galwan post, which had been surrounded by enemy forces in August, but no attempt made to relieve the besieged garrison.

On 24 October, Indian forces fought to hold the Rezang La Ridge, in order to prevent a nearby airstrip from falling to the Chinese. After realizing the magnitude of the attack; Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn in order to consolidate a regroup in the event that China probed south of their claim line.

Aftermath

China

According to the China's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in its western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilized along the Line of Actual Control.

According to James Calvin, even though China won a military victory it lost in terms of its international image. Western nations, especially the United States, were already suspicious of Chinese attitudes, motives and actions. These nations saw China's goals as world conquest and clearly viewed china as the aggressor in the Border war. China's first nuclear weapon test in October 1964 and her support of Pakistan in the 1965 India Pakistan war tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.

India

The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the

future, and placed pressure on Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India. Indians reacted with a surge in patriotism and memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the war. Arguably the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defenses and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of "*brotherhood*". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression. Indians in general became highly skeptical of china and it's military. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of Indian's attempts at establishing a long-standing peace with China and started to question Nehru's usage of the term "Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai" the war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the Cold War bloc superpowers.

The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defense Minister Menon, who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernize India's military further. India's policy of weaponization via indigenous sources and

Self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan, a close ally of China, began a policy of provocation against India by infiltrating Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately triggering the second Kashmir war with India in 1965. However, India had set up the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report to determine what the reason was behind India's unpreparedness in the war, and was prepared for the Pakistani military. The result was inconclusive, since sources were divided on what decides victory. Some sources argued that since India had captured more territory than Pakistan, India had clearly won. However, others argued that India had taken significant losses considering the country's larger military and hence, the outcome of the war was inconclusive. Two year later, in 1967, there was a short border skirmish known as the Chola Incident between Chinese and Indian soldiers. In this incident 8 Chinese soldiers and 4 Indian soldiers were killed.

Controversial British Journalist and India baiter Neville Maxwell, writes the *"hopelessly ill prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi ... paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation"*. As a result of the war, the Indian

government commissioned and investigation, resulting in the classified Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organization and equipment. Maxwell also claimed that the Indian role in international affairs after the border war was also greatly reduced after the war and India's standing in the non-aligned movement suffered.

According to James Calvin, an analyst from the U.S. Navy, India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles (8.3 million hectares, 83,000sq.km.) of disputed territory even if she felt that NEFA was hers all along. The new Indian republic had avoided international alignment; by asking for help during the war, India demonstrated her willingness in her army. She would more than double her military manpower in the next two years and she would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic problems. India's efforts to improve her military posture significantly enhanced her army's capabilities and preparedness